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THE ROLE OF FAMILIES AS SURROGATE
DECISIONMAKERS AFTER CRUZAN V
DIRECTOR, MISSOURI
DEPAR TMENT OF HEALTH
Cindy Hylton Rushton * and Elizabeth E. Hogue**
I. INTRODUCTION
Nancy Cruzan was twenty-five years old when she was in an automobile
accident. When rescue personnel arrived, her heart was not beating and she
was not breathing. Her heartbeat and respiration were restored at the scene
of the accident, and Nancy was transported to a local hospital. A neurosur-
geon who examined her there hypothesized that she had cerebral contusions
compounded by significant lack of oxygen. He estimated that Nancy was
deprived of oxygen for between twelve and fourteen minutes.'
Nancy remained in a coma for three weeks. She then progressed to a
semiconscious state where she was able to ingest some nourishment. In or-
der to ensure proper nourishment and hydration, however, physicians at-
tending Nancy asked her husband for permission to insert a gastrostomy
feeding tube, allowing them to route nourishment directly into Nancy's
stomach. Nancy's husband consented to the procedure, and surgeons then
implanted the feeding and hydration tube.2
Further efforts to rehabilitate Nancy failed. She remained in a Missouri
state hospital in a persistent vegetative state. Generally, individuals in this
state exhibit motor reflexes but appear to have no cognitive function.4
* Clinical Nurse Specialist in Ethics, The Johns Hopkins Children's Center, Baltimore,
Maryland; B.S.N., University of Kentucky; M.S.N., Medical University of South Carolina;
Doctoral Candidate, School of Nursing, Catholic University of America.
** B.A., Emory University; J.D., The University of Maryland.
1. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 411 (Mo. 1988) (en banc), aftd sub nom. Cruzan
v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990).
2. Id.
3. Id.; see also Gladwell, Woman in Right to Die Case Succumbs: Cruzan Was in Coma
for Eight Years; Court Ruling Allowed Tube Removal, Wash. Post, Dec. 27, 1990, at A3, col. 1.
On December 14, 1990, Ms. Cruzan's family received permission from a state court to discon-
nect the tube supplying her with food and water. On December 26, at 3:00 a.m., she died of
dehydration while anti-euthanasia protestors held a vigil outside the hospital.
4. Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d at 411.
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Specifically,
[v]egetative state describes a body which is functioning entirely in
terms of its internal controls. It maintains temperature. It main-
tains heartbeat and pulmonary ventilation. It maintains digestive
activity. It maintains reflex activity of muscles and nerves for low
level conditioned responses. But there is no behavioral evidence of
either self-awareness or awareness of the surroundings in a learned
manner. 5
After several years, it became clear that Nancy would probably not regain
her mental capacity. Nancy's parents asked practitioners treating her to
stop nourishment and to remove the gastrostomy tube, but since this action
would eventually result in her death, hospital personnel refused to honor
their request without court approval.6
Mr. and Mrs. Cruzan then sought court approval for their request to re-
move the tube. The trial court granted the request on the basis that a person
in Nancy's condition had a fundamental right under the Missouri State and
United States Constitutions to refuse, or direct the withdrawal of, proce-
dures that prolong life. The court determined that Nancy's statements to a
housemate prior to her accident-that she would not want "to continue her
life unless she could live 'halfway normally' "-constituted a sufficient ex-
pression of Nancy's wishes to support the withdrawal of the tube.7
The Supreme Court of Missouri reversed the decision of the trial court.
Although agreeing that there was a right to refuse treatment based upon the
common law doctrine of informed consent,8 the court disagreed that there
was a sufficient basis in this case to recognize Nancy's right to refuse treat-
ment. Nancy's statements to her housemate were unreliable, said the court,
for the purpose of judicially recognizing her purported wish to withdraw
treatment.9
The state supreme court further declined to recognize a constitutional
right to privacy as a basis for the decision to withdraw Nancy's feeding tube.
The court observed that no such right to privacy could be found in the Mis-
souri State Constitution and doubted whether such a right existed under the
5. In re Jobes, 3 ISSUEs L. & MED. 183, 185 (1987); In re Jobes, 108 N.J. 394, 403, 529
A.2d 434, 438 (1982) (family or close friend of patient in irreversible vegetative state may
exercise right to refuse life-sustaining treatment).
6. Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d at 410.
7. Id. at 411.
8. See Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 129-30, 105 N.E. 92,
93 (1914) ("Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what
shall be done with his own body.").
9. Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d at 424. Ms. Cruzan's roommate testified that Ms. Cruzan would
not want to continue in a vegetative existence without hope.
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United States Constitution.' 0
Finally, the Missouri Supreme Court rejected the argument that Nancy's
parents were entitled to order the termination of nourishment and hydration
for their daughter. It concluded that persons cannot assume that choice for
incompetent patients in the absence of the formalities required under Mis-
souri's living will statutes or other clear and convincing evidence of a pa-
tient's wish to withdraw medical treatment."
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether
Nancy possessed a right to refuse treatment under the United States Consti-
tution that would require the hospital to withdraw life-sustaining treatment
under the circumstances. 2 The Court further addressed the following ques-
tion: Who has the right to make (or condition) decisions regarding the with-
drawal of life-sustaining treatment in behalf of mentally incapacitated
patients?'
3
This essay explores the legal and ethical bases for surrogate decisionmak-
ing by family members in these situations.. This essay concludes that a
model of family-centered care for pediatric patients should be transposed
upon decisions to withdraw treatment.' 4 If treating professionals believe
that families make decisions which are not in the best interests of patients,
they are free to challenge those decisions before hospital ethics committees
and in the courts. As the states begin to adopt standards in light of Cruzan,
other models of decisionmaking must be addressed to permit states to con-
sider a family-centered model of decisionmaking in behalf of incompetent
patients.
II. THE SUPREME COURT RULING
In addressing decisions made in behalf of incompetent individuals, the
Court, -in a 5-4 decision, initially recognized that the choice between life and
death is a deeply personal decision of obvious finality. Each state, said the
Court, has the right to safeguard the personal element of this choice through
the imposition of strenuous evidentiary requirements. The due process
10. Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d at 417.
11. Id. at 425.
12. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990).
13. Id. at 2852.
14. For cases recognizing parental authority to refuse treatment in the child's behalf be-
cause of incompetence or youth, see generally In re Barry, 445 So. 2d 365 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1984) (interest of a ten-month old terminally ill child lacking cognitive brain function out-
weighed those of the state); In re L.H.R., 253 Ga. 439, 321 S.E.2d 716 (1984) (parent or legal
guardian of terminally ill infant may exercise the infant's right to terminate treatment); In re
Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976) (father appointed guardian of his daughter and
allowed to withdraw life support).
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clause of the United States Constitution protects an interest in life, as well as
an individual's right to refuse medical treatment.
1 5
The Court further recognized that, unlike Nancy, not all incompetent pa-
tients will have loved ones available who are willing to make difficult treat-
ment decisions. The Court also acknowledged that there are unfortunate
cases in which family members act based upon their own best interests to the
exclusion of the best interests of the patient. As a result, states are entitled
to guard against potential abuse in these situations through the imposition of
a heightened evidentiary burden to determine the patient's intent.
16
Based upon these considerations, the Court rejected arguments that close
family members must be permitted to substitute their judgment for that of
an incompetent patient in the absence of substantial proof that the family's
decision reflected one that the patient would make for herself. The Court
expressed absolute confidence in Nancy's mother and father as loving and
caring parents; actually, if Missouri were required by the United States Con-
stitution to recognize a familial right of "substituted judgment," the Cruzans
would be qualified decisionmakers. 7 The Court, however, held that the due
process clause requires only that the State recognize the patient's judgment.
While close family members may have worthy and noble feelings for the
patient, these feelings may not be entirely disinterested if the family does not
want to witness the continuation of a life considered hopeless, futile, or
degrading. 8
The Court added that there are no automatic assurances that the views of
close family members will necessarily be similar to those of the patient. All
of the identified reasons for permitting Missouri to require clear and con-
vincing evidence of a patient's wishes led the Court to conclude that the
states may choose to defer only to a patient's wishes and to deny recognition
of familial wishes. As a result, Nancy's parents, although previously recog-
nized by the Court as loving and caring, were unable to exercise their judg-
ment in behalf of their daughter." '
The Court's conclusion may best be described as a categorical rejection of
any rights of family members to make decisions in behalf of their loved ones;
as a result, the balance of power between families and the state is no longer
in equilibrium. Instead, the decision disenfranchises family members from
15. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2853.
16. Id.
17. For scholarly discussion of the concept of "substituted judgment," see Liacos, Is
"Substituted Judgment" a Valid Legal Concept?, 5 ISSUEs L. & MED. 215 (1989); Robertson,
Is "Substituted Judgment" a Valid Legal Concept?, 5 ISSUEs L. & MED. 197 (1989).
18. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2856.
19. Id.
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the decisionmaking process and reduces their involvement to that of by-
standers. The only remaining role for family members is to ensure that the
previously expressed wishes of a patient are carried out in the event of that
patient's incompetence.
This result is unsettling because it demonstrates a schizophrenic regard
for families. On the one hand, society espouses and affirms the central im-
portance of family as an institution within our society. Yet when difficult
questions must be resolved, family members, as appropriate decisionmakers,
are discounted. For example, in the Cruzan case, Nancy's husband was per-
mitted to consent to the surgical insertion of the gastrostomy tube, but was
prohibited from removing it when, in his (and Nancy's parents') opinion, the
tube no longer promoted the quality of life Nancy would have wanted. It
appears that a system upheld by Cruzan may undermine our basic values
regarding maintenance and support of family integrity. This bureaucratic,
exclusionary, and individualistic ethic is both isolating and destructive to the
institution of family in our society.
Charles Shannon observed that the moral imperative to maintain the fam-
ily extends beyond social and historical issues:
We are not in a position to replace the family with something
else which will be worse. Those moral surgeons who would cut the
family from the body of human social institutions simply miscon-
ceive its role in our species' biological and cultural life. The media-
tions provided by the family are not just interchangeable loose
parts of our human repertoire, they are things that constitute our
humanity itself.2"
Despite recognition of the so-called "breakdown in the family structure"
of American society, family members remain best able to make decisions in
behalf of their loved ones. In cases where families are divided, or unable to
make sound decisions in the view of the attending physicians, their decision-
making authority may be challenged, or abrogated altogether.
As with children, there are limits to a family's decisionmaking authority.
According to the President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Issues in
Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research:
The presumption that a family spokesperson is the appropriate
surrogate may be challenged for a variety of reasons: decisional
incapacity of family members, unresolvable disagreement among
competent adult members of the family about the correct decision,
evidence of physical or psychological abuse or neglect of the pa-
20. C. SHANNON, THE POLITICS OF THE FAMILY: FROM HOMO SAPIEN TO HoMO
ECONOMICUS 7 (1989).
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tient by the family, an indication that the family's interests conflict
substantially with the patient's, or evidence that the family intends
to disregard the patient's stable values, preferences, or specific ear-
lier instructions about treatment.21
The Commission further recommended that, in spite of the possibility that
all family members may be disqualified as surrogate authorities, consultation
with family members was appropriate during the decisionmaking process.22
III. THE MEANING OF FAMILY
The term "family" encompasses a tremendous range of characteristics,
behaviors, and experiences. As in other western societies, a homogeneous
conception of the family has become obscured in America. Traditional defi-
nitions premised upon kinship and marriage have become obsolete as non-
traditional living arrangements and relationships have emerged.23 No longer
does "family" necessarily represent the nuclear family, comprised of a
mother, father, and children. Our understanding of family composition has
been broadened to accommodate prevailing societal trends such as single
parenthood, culturally blended marriages, communal living arrangements,
and extra-marital cohabitation. 24 Societal disintegration and the destructive
forces of poverty, illiteracy, substance abuse, and violence contribute to the
difficulties in developing a common understanding of the term.
A family is "a collection of individuals who share love, common grief,
dwellings, interests, parentage, concerns, and aspirations."25 Ordinarily,
family is defined by kinship or blood relationships; however, an individual's
"family" may be composed of a close friend or distant relative. This broad
use of the term recognizes that those who are most knowledgeable, and have
the most concern for the individual, may not be relatives by blood or mar-
riage.26 For the purposes of this discussion, the family is
that entity which consists of at least two human beings, one of
whom is an adult, who are in relationship one to another in the
sense that they coexist during at least some portion of time, com-
municate, recognize members, meet some of the emotional needs of
21. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL ISSUES IN MEDICINE AND
BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING
TREATMENT 128 (1983) [hereinafter PRESIDENT'S COMM'N].
22. Id. at 128-29.
23. See generally Hacker, Farewell to the Family?, 29 N.Y. REV. BOOKS 37-42 (1982),
reprinted in J. AREEN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FAMILY LAW 79-88 (1985).
24. See Lewis, The Family-How Relevant?, in THE FAMILY: SETTING PRIORITIES 19 (T.
Brazelton & V. Vaughn eds. 1979).
25. Id.
26. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, supra note 21, at 127.
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members, and experience their identities as both individuals and as
a group.27
IV. A MORAL FRAMEWORK FOR FAMILY DECISIONMAKING
A morally defensible framework for competent adults is based upon a
framework of shared decisionmaking. 2a This framework gives priority both
to promoting a patient's well-being and respecting the patient's right to self-
determination. Choices among treatment options should promote the well-
being of the individual according to his or her unique goals, values, and
preferences. Decisions are shared between the patient and the professionals
who render health care. 29 These professionals offer expert knowledge, rec-
ommendations, and advice about medically accepted and available options,
and the patient interprets those choices in light of her life goals and values.30
To comprehend the values that influence choices of action, the context of an
individual's life, including her familial, cultural, religious, and spiritual affili-
ations and preferences, must be appreciated. 31
When a patient lacks the capacity to make choices, someone else must
represent her particular values and preferences. Generally, family members
act as surrogates unless the individual or the court has previously designated
someone else.32 The surrogate endeavors to make choices based upon the
patient's previously expressed directives or knowledge of her unique prefer-
ences and values. If these criteria are unavailable, the decision is made as a
reasonable person in the patient's circumstances.33 The surrogate acts in the
patient's behalf to interpret the treatment options that will advance the pa-
tient's interests, goals, and preferences. Likewise, a framework based upon
collaboration and shared decisions can also be extended to surrogates, who
make decisions in behalf of their loved ones.34
27. G. White, A Philosophical Analysis of the Normative Status of the Family 12 (1986)
(unpublished manuscript).
28. See generally HASTINGS CENTER, GUIDELINES ON THE TERMINATION OF LIFE-SUs-
TAINING TREATMENT AND THE CARE OF THE DYING (1988) [hereinafter HASTINGS
CENTER].
29. See generally PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL ISSUES IN
MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, MAKING HEALTH CARE DECI-
SIONS: A REPORT ON THE ETHICAL AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF INFORMED CONSENT IN
THE PATIENT-PRACTITIONER RELATIONSHIP (1982).
30. See id. at 43-44.
31. Grodin & Burton, Context and Process in Medical Ethics: The Contribution of Family-
Systems Theory, 6 FAM. SYS. MED. 421, 435 (1988).
32. See HASTINGS CENTER, supra note 28, at 24; PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, supra note 21, at
127-28.
33. HASTINGS CENTER, supra note 28, at 28.
34. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, supra note 21, at 132.
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When surrogate decisions are necessary, various concerns about family
member discretion arise when the patient is no longer legally competent.
One concern questions the ability of a surrogate to interpret the interests of
another.35 A central problem associated with surrogate decisionmaking is
the inherent difficulty in judging (and acting upon) beneficial and burden-
some events experienced by others.36 The legitimacy of judging the quality
of another's life may also be questioned since an individual attaches unique
meaning to her own life. Moreover, "society has a significant interest in
protecting and promoting the high value of human life. ' '3 7 If an individual
documents her preferences and values regarding life and death, however,
those preferences should be honored.38
As a practical matter, the majority of individuals have neither formalized
their values regarding life and death nor identified a guardian to act in their
behalf if incompetent to do so.39 In light of the available options, it is pru-
dent and proper to presume that family members are capable of assuming
the role of surrogate. As Professor Rhoden suggests, the judicial standards
previously used for determining an incompetent patient's wishes have failed
to yield less subjective decisions when family members are disqualified.' A
family's strong bonds of affection and commitment, its history of shared ex-
periences over an extended period of time, its willingness to assume respon-
sibility, and its assessment of the individual's life in question yield the
greatest concern for the well-being of their relative.
Aside from functional characteristics such as procreation, economic coop-
eration, and socialization of children, the family serves as a kinship organi-
zation. As a natural group, a family is emotionally and functionally
interconnected. Under optimal conditions a family: provides support, love,
encouragement, protection, and concern for its members; fosters individua-
tion of its members; attempts to help its members to actualize their potential;
and encourages its members to lead fulfilling lives while cultivating a sense
of belonging.41
Kinship often transcends other relationships. Traditionally, the family
has provided a sanctuary for intimacy in an otherwise impersonal and func-
35. Rhoden, Litigating Life and Death, 102 HARV./L. REV. 375, 378 (1988).
36. In re Peter, 108 N.J. 365, 376, 529 A.2d 419, 425 (1987).
37. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, supra note 21, at 184.
38. See generally Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990); In re
Farrell, 108 N.J. 335, 529 A.2d 404 (1987); In re Eichner, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438
N.Y.S.2d 64 (1981).
39. See Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2857 n. 1 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
40. Rhoden, supra note 35, at 437.
41. Lewis, supra note 24, at 20-22.
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tionalized world.42 These intimate relationships transcend impersonal as-
sociations with others and lead to more meaningful relationships based upon
personal commitments to one another. Personal commitments to others are
composed of these intimate relationships and are central to defining oneself
"even when the concerns of the relationship are independent of, or hostile to,
the values of the culture and the welfare of others."4 3
Family members often experience a "privileged emotional climate" wor-
thy of protection from intrusion by outsiders." As the nuclear family devel-
oped, a shield of privacy was erected to protect the family from outside
intrusion. Like other intimate relationships, social intrusion into family rela-
tionships has traditionally been limited, or at least regulated, by giving prior-
ity to standards of privacy and personal autonomy.45 By doing so, intimate
personal relationships may flourish in a protective environment. As a result,
a sense of solidarity emerges that separates the interests of individual family
members from those of the surrounding community.46 Strict standards
should therefore govern warranted intrusions into family relationships.
Families also serve as a normative system that consists of formal (and
informal) rules and regulations which govern the conduct of major aspects of
life. This complex system of norms is organized for the preservation of basic
familial and societal values.4 " The emergence of a consistent system of
shared values begins in early childhood and continues throughout one's life,
and the family of origin plays an important role in shaping this view of the
world.4 8 Therefore, family members have a unique perspective on the life
experiences and values of a relative, based upon a shared value structure and
common experiences.
For example, a family may place high priority on achievement and cogni-
tive ability. 'Throughout childhood, activities that promote academic
42. May, The Metaphysical Plight of the Family, 2 HASTINGS CENTER STUD. 19, 19 (May
1974).
43. Schoeman, Rights of Children, Rights of Parents, and the Moral Basis of the Family, 91
ETHICS 6, 14 (1980).
44. E. SHORTER, THE MAKING OF THE MODERN FAMILY 205 (1975).
45. Laws infringing on a person's right to privacy are subject to strict scrutiny and will be
upheld only upon a demonstration that the law is necessary to serve a compelling state interest.
See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (invalidating state law barring woman's choice of abor-
tion); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (extended right of access to contraceptives to
unmarried persons); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (invalidating state criminal
law barring married couples from using contraceptives); cf Kramer, The Birth of Privacy Law:
A Century Since Warren and Brandeis, 39 CATH. U.L. REV. 703 (1990) (discussing the genesis
of the "right to be let alone" and describing its incorporation into contemporary American
jurisprudence).
46. Schoeman, supra note 43, at 15.
47. See generally E. GROVES, THE FAMILY AND ITS RELATIONSHIPS (1932).
48. Id.
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achievement are consistently rewarded, while irresponsible' behavior and
poor grades are consistently reprimanded. Through family discussions and
interactions, individual contributions to society are evaluated by their poten-
tial to advance the quality (or state) of knowledge in a particular field. If an
individual from this particular family were asked for her definition of a
meaningful life, her response would predictably mirror the manifested values
of her family. In addition, a family's experience in making decisions and
managing stress plays an intimate role in how health care decisions are con-
sidered and made.
The family also serves as an instrument or agent of the larger society to
reinforce and sanction the behaviors of its members and to assure that the
broad goals of society are upheld. The internal control and authority struc-
ture of the family provides the system by Which rules and obligations are
enforced and rewarded. Hence, shared values, beliefs, meanings, and pat-
terns of interaction develop within, and are expressed by, the family, reflect-
ing their uniqueness and consistency with larger social structures. For
instance, a family that values achievement and cognitive ability would likely
view a life in a persistent vegetative state as a life not worth living. Their
viewpoint would reflect not only the unique view of their family; it would
reflect a common societal sentiment that a life devoid of pleasure and mean-
ingful interaction is not in the best interests of the individual.
One reason for disqualifying family members as surrogate decisionmakers
is their questionable emotional stability. Many have suggested that the cri-
ses surrounding illness and injury generate such tremendous stress that fam-
ily members are incapable of making rational judgments. Traditionally, the
emotions have been viewed as disruptive forces that obscure rational judg-
ment and compel us to behave in "regrettable, or at least irrational, ways."49
Moreover, the traditional Kantian view of moral judgment, predicated on
rationality, impartiality, and universality, instructs us to divorce our moral
judgments from the distractions of emotion.50
Certainly, family members experience a great deal of emotional upheaval
during crises. Instead of viewing the emotional state as a liability, however,
some authors have suggested that emotions serve an important role in deci-
sionmaking.5" In recent literature, emotions play not only a motivational
role, as some traditionalists acknowledge; they also perform an epistemologi-
49. Calhoun & Solomon, Introduction to WHAT IS AN EMOTION?: CLASSICAL READINGS
IN PHILOSOPHICAL PSYCHOLOGY 8 (C. Calhoun & R. Solomon eds. 1984).
50. L. BLUM, FRIENDSHIP, ALTRUISM AND MORALITY 2 (1980).
51. See, e.g., Callahan, The Role of Emotion in Ethical Decision-Making, 18 HASTINGS
CENTER REP. 9, 9 (June/July 1988) ("The ideal goal is to come to an ethical decision through
a personal equilibrium in which emotion and reason are both activated and in accord.").
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cal (or informing) role in moral judgment. From this perspective, emotions
are viewed as an outlet for revealing the morally salient features of a situa-
tion; they are a reflection of what is important. 52 Emotions serve both to
raise the consciousness and motivate action. When emotions are activated
by some stimulus, such as the catastrophic cerebral injury of a loved one, a
cascade of responses are activated to serve as beacons for individual action.
Emotions encourage action. Hence, emotional involvement may promote
perseverance in the resolution of difficult ethical dilemmas."a
Because of their emotional investment and energized emotional state, fam-
ily members are uniquely qualified to act as surrogates for their relatives.
Health care providers or agents of the court cannot generate an emotional
investment in the individual which is commensurate with that of the family.
They lack the benefit of shared experiences over time and may therefore
draw only upon their professional relationship with the individual when de-
termining a patient's best interest. They may also have other competing in-
terests. Consequently, a court's reliance on objective standards and
generalized principles, which are used in a dispassionate and disinterested
manner, may prohibit an accurate and complete appreciation of the context
of the decision and the relevant life goals, values, and preferences of the
incompetent individual.
If the emotions of family members are viewed as informative, rather than
obfuscating, they provide an important dimension for assessment and action.
The emotions serve as a barometer for both recognizing regions of the situa-
tion that are morally significant and identifying an occasion for moral ac-
tion. A moral framework that (i) attends to the particularities and context
of a specific situation, (ii) incorporates the values and expectations involved
in familial roles and relationships, and (iii) cultivates moral sensitivity to
emotions will yield a more satisfactory resolution to the quandary of contin-
ued treatment.
54
Another concern with family-centered decisionmaking involves the as-
sumption that a family will advance its interests over those of the individual.
As John Hardwig has argued, a family has legitimate interests when a rela-
tive's life has a direct impact on the lives of others. 5 Familial duties and
participation in family activities are the direct responsibility of all members
52. See generally C. TAYLOR, HUMAN AGENCY AND LANGUAGE: PHILOSOPHICAL PA-
PERS (1985).
53. Callahan, supra note 51, at 10.
54. See generally J. CHILDRESS, WHO SHOULD DECIDE?: PATERNALISM IN HEALTH
CARE 55 (1982) (chapter entitled Respect for Persons).
55. Hardwig, What about the Family?, 20 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 5, 5 (Mar./Apr.
1990).
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of a society. Although there is little formal punishment for unfulfilled family
obligations, there are pervasive and consistent socially mediated pressures,
and direct and indirect rewards and sanctions, all of which motivate individ-
uals to conform to familial and societal norms.56 The essence of family
membership requires moral decisionmaking based upon utilitarianism.57
Therefore, family members necessarily have interconnected interests that
may not be separated.
When an individual is permanently unconscious and incapable of self-ex-
pression, some have argued that her interests are limited to the prolongation
of biological life.58 Since these individuals cannot be burdened in the usual
sense, and the reasons for continued treatment may be absent, an assessment
of the burdens of continued existence must be enlarged reasonably to con-
sider the burdens on those most affected by their care-the family.59
This assessment should not deliberately disregard the autonomy of the
individual. Rather, an enlarged conception of respect for the person, which
encompasses respect for the family, is necessary to appreciate that person
fully. To treat the patient respectfully is to acknowledge and value her exist-
ence outside the medical context without resort solely to the advancement
and preservation of professional or state interests. 60 The patient's interests
are necessarily embedded in the interests of her family members, to whom
her life is valuable. To respect the individual fully is to acknowledge the
importance of her world and the relationships that are central to it.
Unilateral decisionmaking based solely upon "medical indications" or
state statutes denies the fullness of an individual's life and the value of the
relationships which have sustained it over a lifetime. As Professor Annas
has claimed, unilateral decisionmaking denies a person like Nancy Cruzan
the right to have her family speak for her and to exercise its natural, protec-
tive role.6 Thus, "she is deprived of her only voice and is effectively made a
nonperson."62 Unfortunately, individuals constructing health policy, and
those involved in individual health care decisions, often mistrust the motives
of a family because of a limited number of personal experiences. Those neg-
56. W.J. GOODE, THE FAMILY 6 (1964).
57. Hardwig, supra note 55, at 6.
58. J. GLOVER, CAUSING DEATH AND SAVING LIVES 39-59 (1977); McCormick, To Save
or Let Die: The Dilemma of Modern Medicine, 229 J. A.M.A. 172, 175 (1974).
59. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, supra note 21, at 185.
60. These arguments may also be applied to the care of children. See Rushton & Glover,
Involving Parents in Decisions to Forego Life-Sustaining Treatment for Critically III nfants and
Children, 1 A.A.C.N. CLINICAL ISSUES IN CRITICAL CARE NURSING 206 (1990).
61. Annas, Nancy Cruzan in China, 20 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 39, 39-40 (Sept./Oct.
1990).
62. Id. (endnote omitted).
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ative experiences color future familial interactions and are translated into a
defensive and distrusting, rather than a supportive and faithful, approach to
decisionmaking, which ultimately devalues the family as a decisionmaker.
V. LEGAL BASIS OF FAMILY DECISIONMAKING IN DECLINING
TREATMENT
The legal basis for a family-centered model of decisionmaking may be de-
rived from judicial decisions regarding (i) withdrawal of life-sustaining
treatment and (ii) "no code" or "do not resuscitate orders."
States (other than Missouri) may reject the clear and convincing eviden-
tiary standard of Cruzan when assessing the patient's interests by following
In re Nancy Ellen Jobes.63 In that case, the Supreme Court of New Jersey
recognized the primacy of family member decisions in behalf of incompetent
loved ones.
Nancy Jobes was pregnant with her first child when she was injured in an
automobile accident on March 21, 1980. After her admission to Riverside
Hospital for treatment of the injuries sustained, doctors discovered that her
fetus had died. During surgery to remove the fetus, Mrs. Jobes suffered a
loss of oxygen and blood to the brain. This caused irreversible damage to
the portion of her brain controlling thought and movement. Mrs. Jobes
never regained consciousness."
In July 1980 Mrs. Jobes was transferred to the Lincoln Park Nursing
Home. Her condition remained unchanged. She was incontinent and re-
quired a catheter for continuous bladder irrigation. Mrs. Jobes received rou-
tine enemas for bowel evacuation and suffered from chronic urinary tract
infections. Antibiotics and antiseizure medications were regularly adminis-
tered as well. Because Mrs. Jobes was unable to take sustenance orally she
received nutrition and hydration through a jejunostomy tube (j-tube) in-
serted directly into her small intestine.6 5
After Mrs. Jobes had remained in a persistent vegetative state for five
years, her husband petitioned the Chancery Division for a court order that
would permit the removal of the feeding tube. The nursing home had re-
63. 108 N.J. 394, 529 A.2d 434 (1987).
64. Jobes, 108 N.J. at 401, 529 A.2d at 437. For a concise analysis of this decision, see In
re Jobes, 3 IssuEs L. & MED. 183 (1987).
65. Jobes, 108 N.J. at 402, 529 A.2d at 438. See generally Comment, Artificial Nutrition
and the Terminally Ill: How Should Washington Decide?, 61 WASH. L. REV. 419 (1986). The
jejunostomy tube introduces liquified food into the small intestine. Complications often result,
including wound opening, herniation, peritonitis, nerve damage, and hemorrhage. Id. at 425-
26 nn.49-50.
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fused this request on moral grounds.66
After a seven-day trial, the court found that there was clear and convinc-
ing evidence that Mrs. Jobes was in a persistent vegetative state and would
want the j-tube removed. Removal of the tube; was authorized; however, the
court held that the nursing home would not have to participate and could
transfer Mrs. Jobes to another facility. 67
The nursing home and Mr. Jobes appealed; the New Jersey Supreme
Court granted direct certification. The court held that families or close
friends of an irreversibly vegetative patient may exercise judgment and re-
fuse life-sustaining medical treatment in the patient's behalf. The court
stated that a guardian must be appointed only if no close relatives are avail-
able and the patient has not left clear and convincing evidence that they wish
for another to make medical decisions in their behalf.68
Applying this rule to the case, the court observed that the family of Mrs.
Jobes was a close and loving one. The court therefore assumed that the
family would be the most qualified surrogate because of its intimate knowl-
edge of the patient's philosophy of life. The court defined close family mem-
bers to include spouses, parents, siblings, or adult children. A court may
also look to aunts, uncles, cousins, or others if they function as the patient's
nuclear family. In the absence of these persons, a court may appoint a
guardian to make decisions in the patient's behalf.69
The court acknowledged that some situations may arise where family
members will not act to protect a patient's best interests. However, these
cases are exceptional. In this situation, the burden is placed upon health
care professionals to initiate guardianship proceedings.7°
The court also recognized situations where health care professionals fail to
determine whether a family is acting in the patient's best interests. However,
practitioners will not be subject to either criminal or civil liability if these
determinations are made in good faith.71
Thus, Jobes provides a strong basis for a state to reject the standards up-
held in Cruzan in favor of a decisionmaking process that relies on the fam-
ily-unless health care professionals prove that the family lacks appropriate
judgment or ability to make decisions in behalf of the patient.
66. Jobes, 108 N.J. at 410, 529 A.2d at 442.
67. Id. at 401, 529 A.2d at 437.
68. Id. at 420, 529 A.2d at 447. See generally Moore, Two Steps Forward, One Step Back:
An Analysis of New Jersey's Latest Right-to-Die Decisions, 19 RUTGERS L.J. 955 (1988) (ana-
lyzing Jobes and its two companion cases).
69. Jobes, 108 N.J. at 420, 529 A.2d at 447.
70. Id.
71. Id.
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In addition to cases like Jobes, decisions concerning "no code" or "do not
resuscitate" orders may also provide a strong foundation for family-centered
decisionmaking. An example is In re Shirley Dinnerstein.72
The patient in that case was a sixty-seven year old woman suffering from
Alzheimer's disease. Destroying the brain, the condition is progressive and
unremitting; it results in loss of memory, personality disorganization, loss of
intellectual function, and, eventually, the loss of all motor function. The
disease typically leads to a vegetative or comatose condition, followed by
death. To date, there is no known cure for the disease and no available
treatment which can slow or arrest its course.7
3
Shirley Dinnerstein was diagnosed with Alzheimer's disease in July 1975.
She entered a nursing home in November 1975, where her complete disori-
entation, frequent psychotic outbursts, and deteriorating ability to control
elementary bodily functions made her dependent upon intensive nursing
care. 74
In February 1978 the patient suffered a massive stroke, leaving her com-
pletely paralyzed on her left side. By the time the case was decided, she was
in a persistent vegetative state and fed through a nasogastric tube. Her con-
dition was hopeless because she would never recover; yet, no one could pre-
dict with certainty when she would die.75 Under these circumstances, her
attending physician recommended that, when and if cardiac arrest occurred,
resuscitation efforts should not be undertaken.
Resuscitation efforts typically involve the use of cardiac massage or chest
compression and delivery of oxygen and mechanical ventilation through an
endotracheal tube into the lungs. Various plastic tubes are usually inserted
intravenously to supply medications (or stimulants) directly to the heart.
These medications may also be supplied by direct injection into the heart
with a long needle. A defibrillator may be used, applying electric shock to
the heart to induce contractions. A pacemaker, in the form of an electrical
conducting wire, may also be fed through a large blood vessel directly to the
heart's surface to stimulate contractions and to regulate heartbeat. These
procedures, to be effective, must be initiated without delay because cerebral
anoxia will normally produce irreversible brain damage within three to five
minutes, and total brain death within fifteen minutes. Many of the proce-
dures described above may be characterized as highly intrusive and, in some
cases, violent. The defibrillator, for example, causes violent and painful
72. 6 Mass. App. Ct. 466, 380 N.E.2d 134 (1978).
73. Dinnerstein, 6 Mass. App. Ct. at 467, 380 N.E.2d at 135.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 467-68, 380 N.E.2d at 135.
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muscle contractions.76
The patient's immediate family, consisting of a son and daughter, agreed
with the doctor's recommendation to withhold resuscitation in the event of
cardiac or respiratory arrest. They joined with their mother's physician in
petitioning the court for a "no code order. 77
The Massachusetts Appeals Court decided that withholding life-sus-
taining treatment in the form of resuscitation, to ease the imminent passing
of a terminally ill patient, was permissible in light of both the patient's his-
tory and condition and the wishes of her family.78
Jobes and Dinnerstein are examples of medico-legal decisions that offer an
analytical framework for family-centered decisionmaking. While states re-
main free to reject family members as decisionmakers in accordance with the
Cruzan case, there is a sound legal basis for family-centered decisions involv-
ing incompetent patients.
VI. A FAMILY-CENTERED MODEL FOR SURROGATE DECISIONMAKING
The concept of family-centered care provides the basis for delivering
health care services to children. 79 This approach is based upon respect for
the family as the constant in the child's life; it recognizes the unique
strengths of each family in caring for their child, and it supports collabora-
tion at all levels of decisionmaking. In addition, it advocates optimal com-
76. Id. at 468-69, 380 N.E.2d at 135-36. Early defibrillation is now accepted both nation-
ally and internationally as the simplest, safest, and most accurate treatment for cardiac arrest.
The widespread implementation of automated external defibrillators has increased the survival
rate from sudden cardiac arrest. Bocka, Automatic External Defibrillators, 18 ANNALS
EMERG. MED. 1264 (1989); Cummins, From Concept to Standard-of-Care? Review of the
Clinical Experience with Automated External Defibrillators, 18 ANNALS EMERG. MED. 1269
(1989).
77. Also referred to as an ONTR (order not to resuscitate) or a DNR (do not resuscitate),
a "no code" order, when "entered in a patient's medical record[,] instructs the nursing staff, as
part of the attending physician's ongoing instructions to the nursing staff for the care of the
patient, not to summon the code team in the event of cardiac or respiratory arrest." Dinner-
stein, 6 Mass. App. Ct. at 469 n.3, 380 N.E.2d at 136 n.3 (citing Rablein, Gillerman & Rice,
Orders Not to Resuscitate, 295 NEW ENG. J. MED. 364 (1976)); see also Legislative Comment,
Do Not Resuscitate Orders: A Matter of Life and Death in New York, 4 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH
L. & POL'Y 449 (1988) (analyzing the New York DNR law as it pertains to an adult with
capacity, an adult without capacity, and a minor).
78. Dinnerstein, 6 Mass. App. Ct. at 474-75, 380 N.E.2d at 138-39. Although cardi-
opulmonary resuscitation (CPR) is meant to prevent unexpected death, CPR is not appropri-
ate in the care of a terminally ill patient because it may violate "an individual's right to die
with dignity." Standards for Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation (CPR) and Emergency Cardiac
Care, 227 J. A.M.A. 837, 864 (1974).
79. See T. SHELTON, E. JEPPSON & B. JOHNSON, FAMILY-CENTERED CARE FOR CHIL-
DREN WITH SPECIAL HEALTH CARE NEEDS 7 (2d ed. 1987).
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munication among health care providers and family members.'° These
concepts are generally applicable to family decisionmaking, particularly
when an individual becomes incapable of self-expression.
A model for surrogate decisionmaking that recognizes the central role of
the family is necessary to protect and interpret the interests .of its members.
This model maintains family integrity while creating a balanced partnership
between families and health care professionals. A family-centered health
care system can become a reality through the establishment of structures
that facilitate optimal partnerships between the individual, the family, health
care professionals, and society.81 States should adopt family-centered poli-
cies to address surrogate treatment decisions.
VII. RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE STATES
States should begin with a framework that affirms the primacy of the fam-
ily as the surrogate decisionmaker. Absent disqualifying motivations, a fam-
ily's decision to discontinue treatment should be honored.
82
In cases involving surrogate decisionmakers, the decisionmaker's actions
should be guided by her unique interpretation of the patient's best interest.
This interpretation should be based upon historical evidence, shared exper-
iences, and common values. A family must also consider its own interests in
relation to (i) their moral obligations as family members83 and (ii) the
boundaries of the moral obligation to preserve life at all costs.8 4 Generally,
as long as the decisions of the family fall within the range of morally accept-
able action, the decisions should be honored.
The presumption favoring familial decisionmaking for the terminally ill is
not absolute. States must establish procedural safeguards both to ensure ad-
equate evaluation of the evidence concerning the patient's wishes and iden-
tify appropriate surrogates.8" Generally, physicians and state authorities
80. Id.; see also SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT: CHILDREN WITH SPECIAL HEALTH
CARE NEEDS CAMPAIGN '87: COMMITMENT TO FAMILY CENTERED COORDINATED CARE
FOR CHILDREN WITH SPECIAL HEALTH CARE NEEDS (1987).
81. See generally Gibbs, Love and Let Die, TIME, Mar. 19, 1990, at 64 ("[I]n a poll con-
ducted last month for TIME/CNN, 80% of those surveyed said decisions about ending the
lives of terminally ill patients who cannot decide for themselves should be made by their fami-
lies and doctors, rather than lawmakers.").
82. Rhoden, supra note 35, at 437 n.273 ("According to a poll conducted for the Presi-
dent's Commission, 57% of persons would want a family member to make medical decisions
for them if they were incapacitated.").
83. Hardwig, supra note 55, at 6.
84. See generally On Withdrawing Artificial Nutrition and Hydration, ORIGINS, June 7,
1990, at 53; NCCB Committee for Pro-Life Activities, Guidelines for Legislation in Life-Sus-
taining Treatment, ORIGINS, Jan. 24, 1985, at 526.
85. Rhoden, supra note 35, at 439-40.
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must bear the burden of proof when questioning the motives and competen-
cies of familial decisionmakers 8
6
Instead of categorically discounting families, states must address the spe-
cial cases that challenge this basic premise. For instance, individuals who
are "unbefriended" and lack ties of kinship or affiliation with others will
require alternative surrogates to the family-centered approach. Although
consensus for the proper solution to these problems is lacking, institutions
and states must develop and test (rather than avoid) the various models of
surrogate appointment. Some suggestions include surrogate committees,
court-appointed guardians, state ombudsmen, or public fiduciaries.' 7 .
However, not all family members are willing to assume the role of surro-
gate when decisions to forego treatment are involved. When a family cannot
(or is unwilling to) accept the surrogacy role, or when there are serious ques-
tions surrounding the propriety of family decisions, an unencumbered and
timely process to identify an appropriate surrogate must be instituted. Clari-
fication of the circumstances that necessitate judicial intervention is essen-
tial. For example, a requirement for review by ethics committees prior to
judicial review should be firmly established.
Strategies to support and enhance the capabilities of the family as deci-
sionmaker must be developed. Consumers must be educated about living
wills and durable powers of attorney for health care issues. Health care pro-
fessionals and families must be encouraged to assist patients to "authenti-
cally exercise their freedom of self-determination." 8 According to Sally
Gadow, individuals should therefore be assisted "to discern and clarify their
values in the situation, and on the basis of that self-examination, to reach
decisions which express their reaffirmed, perhaps recreated, complex of
values." 9
A greater articulation (and reexamination) of health care decisionmaking
is necessary in the moral analysis of decisions to forego treatment. Health
care providers, families, and society must collaborate to define the range of
morally acceptable choices in each individual situation. In doing so, societal
and community standards and values should be examined. No longer, as
Nancy Rhoden suggests, should the technological imperative and the preser-
86. Id. at 441 ("[C]ourts should put the burden of proof on the physician to show that the
family's decision is unreasonable.").
87. HASTINGS CENTER, supra note 28, at 24-25.
88. Gadow, Existential Advocacy. Philosophical Foundation of Nursing, in NURSING:
IMAGES AND IDEALS: OPENING DIALOGUE WITH THE HUMANITIES 85 (S. Spicker & S.
Gadow eds. 1980) (emphasis in original).
89. Id.
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vation of life at all costs be sustained.9 Thus, health care consumers must
take responsibility for communicating with health care providers and policy
makers to articulate relevant values and treatment parameters. Addition-
ally, health care consumers must begin to appreciate the limits of technology
in order to avoid inappropriate demands for futile therapies.9
Living will legislation and procedures identify specific interventions that
should be eliminated when suffering or cognitive impairment precludes cog-
nitive awareness and the exercise of choice.92 When defining their prefer-
ences, competent individuals must be assisted within a framework that
pursues a life worth living, not a life annexed by technology. Throughout
this process, however, health care consumers must recognize that sharing
decisionmaking authority does not mean that they can insist upon any de-
sired treatment. Rather, choices are made from among the medically ac-
ceptable (and available) options which can reasonably be expected to
promote the patient's well-being.93
A framework based upon an individual's values would neither require in-
dividuals to imagine all patient outcomes nor anticipate every contingency.
This is unrealistic and unnecessarily restrictive. For example, the vitalist
may convey a deeply held value for life in any form, regardless of cognitive
functioning. For this individual, prolongation of biological life at all costs
may be her ultimate goal.
To others, however, a life devoid of pleasure, reason, and cognition may
be more burdensome than the expectation of death. For instance, if an indi-
vidual states that they "do not want to be kept alive on a respirator," these
preferences could be illuminated by discerning (i) her perception of what life
on a respirator would be like and (ii) the particularities of why that life
would not be worth living. In this case, the individual may ultimately value
cognitive ability, the capacity to experience pain or pleasure, and meaningful
interaction with others. Moreover, decisionmakers should give import to the
patient's self-care capabilities, such as feeding independently, and the pa-
90. Rhoden, supra note 35, at 379.
91. Lamm, High-Tech Health Care and Society's Ability to Pay, HEALTHCARE FIN.
MGMT., Sept. 1990, at 21. "There is an almost unlimited number of things that we can do to
people at the margin. Health Economist Victor Fuchs calls it 'the flat of the curve medicine.'"
Id. at 24; see also P. MENZEL, MEDICAL COSTS, MORAL CHOICES 3 (1983).
92. See generally AMERICAN SOCIETY OF LAW AND MEDICINE, LEGAL AND ETHICAL
ASPECTS OF TREATING CRITICALLY AND TERMINALLY ILL PATIENTS (A. Doudera & J. Pe-
ters eds. 1982); SOCIETY FOR THE RIGHT TO DIE, HANDBOOK OF LIVING WILL LAWS (1987);
P. WILLIAMS, THE LIVING WILL SOURCE BOOK (1986).
93. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, supra note 21, at 43-44. The Commission recommended "that
patient and provider collaborate in a continuing process intended to make decisions that will
advance the patient's interests both in health ... and in self-determination." Id. at 43.
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tient's ability to control independent physiology, such as breathing without a
respirator. When the individual's values are expressed in this way,
caregivers could more accurately assess whether the interventions proposed
will advance or violate an individual's preferences.
A family should be afforded the opportunity to communicate meaning-
fully with policy makers and health care professionals. For example, the
establishment of advisory committees and institutional ethics committees
with members who do not provide health care would enhance the present
understanding of the familial perspective. Mechanisms facilitating an ongo-
ing dialogue with administrators and policy makers are essential to ensure
that institutional policies and legislative initiatives are consistent with com-
munity values. In addition, any developed standards must not unfairly (or
unlawfully) discriminate against the poor and socially disadvantaged seg-
ments of society.
Moreover, the health care community must abrogate the various ,barriers
to optimal decisionmaking in the clinical setting, e.g., environmental barn-
ers, inadequate communication, asymmetric information, lack of support
systems, and paternalistic professional attitudes. A greater commitment to
documentation of patient preferences and values must also occur at every
level of the health care system. Research initiatives that explore the values,
beliefs, and perceptions of family members in the experience of surrogate
decisionmaking would provide policy makers and health care professionals
with substantive fodder for internal policies and therapeutic interventions.
Finally, development of tools to assess the values, motives, and competency
of family members as decisionmakers is necessary.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The health care community must affirm the commitment to the family as
the appropriate surrogate decisionmaker. In doing so, medical professionals
will recognize the interconnected relationships between the biological, psy-
chological, social, and moral dimensions of our lives, as expressed through
the family. Although the authority of the family is not absolute, it is incum-
bent upon health care professionals and legislators to devise policies which
do not unfairly disenfranchise the family by artificially placing it in an adver-
sarial position with one of its members.
